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“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States.” 
J. Kennedy, majority opinion in a 5-3 Decision  
 
Arizona v. United States1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Personal data is usually protected by privacy laws. The well-known Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), and California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) are all founded on the presumption that an individual has the right to be 
left alone. Also, Justice Harlan famously asserted in Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment 
protects one’s expectation of privacy.2 Most Americans have these rights and protections, but not everyone 
in America does. There is a population within the United States that does not have the right of privacy—
who does not have the right to be left alone, and who is not even afforded the basic privacy protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Is there a way to protect these vulnerable individuals when the right to privacy is 
stripped away and the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable? 
Undocumented immigrants have limited Constitutional and privacy rights, so their personal data 
has a high probability of use and abuse. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) are using facial recognition software to identify, target, track, and locate 
undocumented immigrants. This violates the right to be free from unreasonable searches, due process, and 
uses race as a primary means of discrimination. Yet these rights are not enforced or protected through the 
courts. Because of the dangers of using facial recognition and because facial image data cannot be protected 
through privacy avenues, one solution is to protect it with intellectual property law. The harms suffered by 
undocumented immigrants mandate protections and remedies that exist outside of courts. Although not a 
perfect fit, intellectual property law can be adjusted and revised to grant an individual property rights in his 
or her own facial templates to provide undocumented immigrants greater protection over their civil liberties 
than is currently afforded them by the Constitution, Supreme Court, and other federal legislation. 
Part I states modern immigration policies and provides context for the reasoning and concerns 
surrounding facial recognition software and undocumented immigrants. Part II details the judicial problems 
in place for excluding the fruits of facial recognition in immigration deportation hearings and why 
undocumented immigrants are especially vulnerable because they are without Constitutional protections. It 
also analyzes how immigration has evolved and now requires new civil rights protections beyond the 
exclusionary rule. Finally, Part IV explores civil rights laws for undocumented immigrants within an 
intellectual property law framework and analyzes the feasibility, strengths, and weaknesses. 
 
I. HOW FACIAL RECOGNITION WORKS 
 
Facial recognition requires a camera to capture an image, an algorithm to create a “faceprint” or 
“facial template,” a database of stored images, and an algorithm to compare the captured image to the 
database of images or a single image in the database.3 Facial recognition is non-intrusive, like 
 
1 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012). 
2 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). 
3 Rosie Brinckerhoff, Social Network or Social Nightmare: How California Courts Can Prevent Facebook's Frightening Foray 
into Facial Recognition Technology from Haunting Consumer Privacy Rights Forever, 70 Fed. Comm. L.J. 105, 112 (2018). 
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voice recognition, and unlike DNA testing. Of course, inaccuracies occur when images are incorrectly 
matched—the wrong person is identified. This can be caused by variations in external conditions such as 
lighting and the user's position and distance from the camera, as well as variations caused 
by facial expressions, aging and make-up4 or more dubious problems with the software and its application, 
which will be explored in Part III. 
II. HOW THE POLICE AND ICE ARE USING FACIAL RECOGNITION DATA 
 
President Trump was elected under a strong anti-immigration policy. He has strived to regulate 
undocumented immigration, both through controlling future immigration through Mexico with a boarder 
wall as well as decrease the current amount of 11 million undocumented immigrants through deportation.5 
Removing these undocumented immigrants from the United States was a cornerstone of Trump's initial 
appeal to conservatives in the Republican Party, and also one of his most ambitious and potentially 
expensive policies.6 He cited national safety as the reason behind these changes and even went so far as to 
say “Within ICE I am going to create a new special deportation task force focused on identifying and 
quickly removing the most dangerous criminal illegal immigrants in America who have evaded justice.”7 
Immigration falls under the executive branch of the DHS and its law enforcement agency, ICE. 
During the Trump administration’s first fourteen months, there were 58,010 arrests by ICE of people 
without criminal convictions, which was three times as many as during the preceding fourteen months.8 
The administration has expanded the reach of interior enforcement, reduced refugee admissions 
dramatically, and slowed visa processing times, with a modest but noticeable effect on the number of people 
admitted in some visa categories.9 On July 23, 2019, expedited removal proceedings were expanded to be 
applied to all undocumented immigrants who have been in the country for less than 2 years.10 The change 
dramatically expands the ability of DHS to quickly deport certain immigrants without any of the due-
process protections granted to most other people, including the right to an attorney and to a hearing before 
a judge.11 No administration in modern U.S. history has placed such a high priority on immigration policy 
or had an almost exclusive focus on restricting immigration flows, legal and unauthorized alike.12 ICE’s 
emphasis on removal, expansion of power, and change in expedited removal proceedings demonstrate how 
today ICE is under increasing pressure and specific directives to locate and expel as many undocumented 
immigrants as possible.13 
There are 10.5-11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States, according to the 
Pew Research Center, but there are only about 6,100 officers in ICE’s Enforcement and Removal 
 
4 Michael Yang & Francis J. Gorman, What's Yours Is Mine Protection and Security in A Digital World, Md. B.J. 24, 27 (2003).  
5 See Nick Corasaniti, A Look at Trump’s Immigration Plan, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/31/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration-changes.html [https://perma.cc/U8Q2-
FRVZ]. 
6 SARAH PIERCE, JESSICA BOLTER, & ANDREW SELEE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY UNDER TRUMP: DEEP 
CHANGES AND LASTING IMPACTS 15 (2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-policy-trump-deep-changes-
impacts [https://perma.cc/H2TU-YKLB].   
7 Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html [https://perma.cc/U62N-5VFY]. 
8 McKenzie Funk, How ICE Picks Its Target in the Surveillance Age, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/magazine/ice-surveillance-deportation.html [https://perma.cc/3CQJ-6HF2]. 
9 See Yang & Gorman, supra note 4, at 15. 
10 Vanessa Romo, Trump Administration Moves to Speed Up Deportations with Expedited Removal Expansion, NPR (July 22, 
2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/22/744177726/trump-administration-moves-to-speed-up-deportations-with-
expedited-removal-expan [https://perma.cc/B428-C8DJ]. Prior to July 23, 2019, undocumented immigrants who cross into the 
U.S. by land can be deported without an immigration hearing if they are arrested within 100 miles of the border during the first 14 
days after their arrival. Those who arrive by sea can be deported without legal proceedings if they are unable to prove they have 
been living in the U.S. for two years or more. Id.  
11 Id.  
12 See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 15. 
13 See Funk, supra note 8. 
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Operations (E.R.O.) division.14 There are 50 states for ICE to cover, as well as Washington and territories 
like Puerto Rico, which all amount to more than 3.8 million square miles.15 There are continuing staffing 
shortages.16 To make up for its deficiencies in manpower, ICE looks to efficiencies in technology. Big data, 
AI, and algorithms allow ICE to do more with less.17 
DHS and ICE are using social media, real-time cell location data, and artificial intelligence to target 
and locate undocumented immigrants.18 However, this paper will examine only facial recognition software. 
Facial recognition software has huge current and future implications for use in the identification, targeting, 
tracking, and locating of undocumented immigrants and has been debated every few weeks in 2019 alone. 
Fourteen states and Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico issue drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants.19 
At least three of those states—Utah, Washington, and Vermont—are verified as having their DMVs actively 
working with ICE to run facial recognition software through their database of driver’s license photos.20 
Over two dozen states allow law enforcement officials to request such searches against their databases of 
driver’s licenses.21 In addition to the voluntary offer of photo databases, ICE issued subpoenas, without 
probable cause, to gain access to these databases,22 though many requests for searches involved nothing 
more than an email to a DMV official with the target’s “probe photo” attached.23 Warrants are not even 
required. ICE officials have mined state driver’s license databases using facial recognition technology, 
analyzing millions of motorists’ photos without their knowledge.24 
Using facial recognition, ICE obtains personal information from DMV databases. This can be a 
home address, license plate number, or also more intimate details like place of birth or whether a foreign 
passport was used to prove identity.25 ICE can use this information to decide whom to target for immigration 
enforcement and to locate the people it’s targeted.26 They can also use the DMV databases to locate specific 
individuals and the primary government database ICE relies upon is the driver license database.27 According 
to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, ICE agents consider the data in DMV records, among 
others, to be more current and reliable than the DHS address database.28 
The problem with using facial recognition software to mine the data in DMVs is the lack of 
governing authority. ICE admits that no federal policy governs ICE access to or use of DMV data.29 Neither 
Congress nor state legislatures have authorized the development of such a system.30 For the time being, no 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 See id.  
18 See id. 
19 State Laws Providing Access to Driver’s Licenses or Cards, Regardless of Immigration Status, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. 
(April 2020), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/drivers-license-access-table.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8AK-S29Y].  
20 See Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License Database, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/5DWV-7SQU]. 
21 See id. 
22 Id.  
23 Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE find state driver’s license photos are a gold mine for facial recognition searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-
recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/VF6S-FB5L]. 
24 See Edmondson, supra note 20.  
25 See Funk, supra note 8. 
26 Joan Friedland, How ICE Uses Databases and Information-Sharing to Deport Immigrants, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Jan. 25, 
2018), https://www.nilc.org/2018/01/25/how-ice-uses-databases-and-information-sharing-to-deport-immigrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/PAY5-BPG8]. 
27 DOCUMENTS OBTAINED UNDER FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT  
How U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement and State Motor Vehicle Departments Share Information, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR.  
(May 2016), 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/drivers-licenses/ice-dmvs-share-information/ [https://perma.cc/8LKG-QME7]. 
28 Id. (citing Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual Address Reporting Requirement is Questionable, U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Jan. 28, 2005), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-204 [https://perma.cc/BW3N-3ZWU]). 
29 Id. 
30 See Harwell, supra note 23. 
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one is telling ICE they can access DMV databases but also, no one is telling them they cannot. Facial 
recognition is rapidly advancing technology with very few guidelines and protections in place.31 
Tech giant Amazon has also jumped in to help locate and track undocumented immigrants. Their 
Ring Doorbell is a video doorbell, which allows uses to see and talk to people who come to the door. It also 
records these visitors and the data is stored on Amazon’s cloud. Ring is currently partnered with more than 
400 police departments across America.32 These partnerships streamline how Ring video data can be 
accessed by police, even without warrants.33 Currently, Ring does not use facial recognition software but 
has filed a patent in December 2018 to pair the two technologies. The application describes a system that 
the police can use to match the faces of people walking by a doorbell camera with a photo database.34 If a 
match occurs, the person’s face can be automatically sent to law enforcement, and the police could arrive 
in minutes.35 It is not a far leap to assume ICE can also access Ring video data with Ring facial recognition 
software or their own.  
Furthermore, Amazon has pitched another facial recognition tool, Rekognition, to law enforcement 
agencies, including ICE, to target and identify undocumented immigrants.36 Rekognition has the ability to 
identify people from afar, a type of technology immigration officials have voiced interest in for its potential 
enforcement use on the southern border.37 Amazon unveiled Rekognition as a way to analyze images and 
detect faces on a massive scale.38 
III. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures and requires 
federal law enforcement to procure warrants with underlying probably cause to be able to obtain 
information for investigations. In order for a Fourth Amendment violation to occur, a “search” or a “seizure” 
must transpire.39 In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court defined a search as any government action 
that violates an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.40 The Fourth Amendment protects people’s 
privacy and law enforcement must respect it. 
If the Fourth Amendment is violated, the evidence obtained through that unconstitutional search 
and seizure is inadmissible in court.41 A motion to suppress is used to prohibit evidence that has been 
unlawfully obtained by the government.42 “[A] successful motion to suppress . . . lead[s] to the exclusion 
of various forms of evidence.”43 This is called the “exclusionary rule” and it is a judicially instituted remedy 
that penalizes past law enforcement misconduct and deters the same conduct in the future.44 It “weighs the 
 
31 Id. 
32 Rani Molla, How Amazon’s Ring is creating a surveillance network with video doorbells, VOX (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/9/5/20849846/amazon-ring-explainer-video-doorbell [https://perma.cc/3RKA-ZKET]. 
33 Colin Lecher, Amazon’s Ring reportedly partners with more than 200 US Police Departments, THE VERGE (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/29/20746156/amazons-ring-law-enforcement-partnerships [https://perma.cc/5SAT-93TV]. 




36 Drew Harwell, Amazon met with ICE officials over facial recognition system that could identify immigrants, WASH. POST (Oct. 
23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/23/amazon-met-with-ice-officials-over-facial-recognition-
system-that-could-identify-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/Q984-GWJC]. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Stephanie Groff, Where to Draw the Line: The Egregiousness Standard in the Application of the Fourth Amendment in 
Immigration Proceedings and the Racial Profiling Exception, 26 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 87, 92 (2015). 
40 Id. See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
41 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (applying the rule only to Federal officials); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961) (applying the rule to state officials as well). 
42 See Groff, supra note 39, at 91. 
43 Id. at 91–92. 
44 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961). 
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cost of excluding evidence against the benefit of deterring future governmental misconduct.”45 The Fourth 
Amendment is based on the principle of an individual’s right to being secure in an investigation and that 
they investigation is fair. The exclusionary rule is an “essential ingredient” of the Fourth Amendment as 
the right it embodies is vouchsafed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.46 
Immigration removal proceedings are an administrative process governed by guidelines and rules 
under both the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations: 
Aliens and Nationality.47 As civil actions, removal proceedings differ from criminal proceedings, but 
certain constitutional due process protections are nevertheless afforded to aliens,48 such as the right to have 
a hearing presided by a judge, the right to present testimony and evidence, the right to be represented by 
counsel, and can seek appeals through the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).49 After the BIA, a further 
appeal may also be sought in a federal court of appeals. An Immigration Judge may remove an alien for 
any of the reasons in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a), including illegal presence, disregarding a condition of entry, 
committing a crime of moral turpitude, failing to register under the Alien Registration Act, or falsifying 
documents.50 Before the Lopez-Mendoza case was brought to court, most practitioners and courts agreed 
that the exclusionary rule applied to deportation proceedings.51  
In 1984, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza completely changed the way the Fourth Amendment was applied 
to deportation hearings. The Ninth Circuit held that Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) agents 
,the precursor to ICE, violated Adan Lopez-Mendoza's Fourth Amendment rights, and the rights of another 
similarly situated plaintiff, Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, in the course of their immigration arrests, and therefore 
any evidence that the agents had gathered as a result of those unconstitutional arrests should be excluded 
from proceedings in accordance with the exclusionary rule.52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  
In a plurality opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that the exclusionary rule “need 
not apply” in a deportation hearing53 because there are purely civil and not criminal hearings.54 Furthermore, 
she emphasizes that “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding 
is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, 
search, or interrogation occurred.”55 To arrive at her holding, she balances the Fourth’s deterrent effect on 
future law enforcement misconduct against the loss of probative evidence.56 Ultimately, she decides the 
exclusionary rule is not needed to deter future misconduct because there are other safeguards in place. 
First, deportation is possible even without evidence from an investigation because the sole, material 
issue in deportation proceedings is the respondent’s identity and alienage.57 Other evidence can be gathered 
to support the government’s position on alienage. Also, O’Connor again makes it clear that the person and 
identity of the respondent is not suppressible.58 Second, she cites that INS makes few arrests during a year 
(only 500 in 1983!) and very few “challenge the circumstances of their arrests.”59 Third, and in her eyes the 
most important, are the INS’ own internal standard operating procedures to ensure its own officers are 
 
45 Groff, supra note 39, at 92. 
46 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. 
47 Groff, supra note 39, at 91.  
48 Id.  
49 See Katie Benner & Charlie Savage, Due Process for Undocumented Immigrants, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/politics/due-process-undocumented-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/M48T-B45N].  
50 Matthew S. Mulqueen, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1157, 1164 
(2008). 
51 Id. at 1165.  
52 Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to Believe": Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement 
and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2008). 
53 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). 
54 Id. at 1038. 
55 Id. at 1039. 
56 See id. at 1042.  
57 Id. at 1043.   
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 1044. 
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following the Fourth Amendment during investigations and arrests.60 Finally, O’Connor cites other 
remedies available to respondents such as declaratory relief61 and declares that the Court would not deal 
“with egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of 
fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”62 
In the three and a half decades since Lopez-Mendoza, the policies and practices of immigration 
enforcement agencies have changed radically.63 Pretextual traffic stops, warrantless home invasions, illegal 
workplace seizures, unnecessary force, US citizen children detained by armed officers, individuals stopped 
and questioned without any reasonable suspicion and detained without probable cause, have all become 
increasingly frequent and commonplace.64 As mentioned above, INS made only 500 immigration arrests in 
1983.65 That number has increased dramatically and according to the U.S. Department of Justice Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), since 2000, immigration-related cases account for the largest single 
category of federal prosecutions, and account for about half of all federal hearings.66 EOIR records show 
that between 1952 and 1979 (the year that the Lopez-Mendoza respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias 
Sandoval-Sanchez first appeared in immigration court) fewer than fifty motions to suppress evidence or 
terminate proceedings had ever been filed in immigration court.67 In 2018 alone, 22,189 motions to 
terminate were granted.68 O’Connor’s “statistical safeguard”—the low numbers of immigrations arrests and 
challenges has dramatically increased and safeguards must also increase in 2019. 
Lopez- Mendoza hinged mainly on the argument that deportations are civil proceedings and not 
criminal and therefore the balance tips in favor of procuring probative evidence rather than the protection 
of individual liberties. However, now the boundary line between civil and criminal immigration 
proceedings has been blurred. “Crimmigration” is a term. INS has been replaced by  ICE, which combines 
the investigative and intelligence arms of INS as well as the “resources, responsibilities and authorities” of 
the Federal Protective Service, is DHS's largest investigatory unit.69 There are new immigration-related 
crimes, increases in the minimum and maximum sentences for existing immigration crimes, increases in 
the fines imposed on immigrant defendants, and far greater numbers of prosecutions being brought for the 
commission of all immigration-related crimes.70 Professor Stella Birch Elias notes,  
 
[W]hile the immigration-law system has adopted many of the punitive attributes of the 
criminal-law system, such as harsher sentences, higher fines, and greater numbers of 
federal prosecutions, it has failed to adopt the procedural checks and balances that protect 
criminal defendants from arbitrary or unconstitutional applications of the law.71 
 
Facial recognition software is already heavily employed by the FBI, NSA, TSA, CIA, state police, 
and other federal and state agencies for law enforcement purposes. Most of the time, an undocumented 
immigrants only crime is being present in the United States72, yet the same technology and investigative 
tools are being used on them as violent criminals and terrorists. Undocumented immigrants are subject to 
detention and deportation—deprivations of both liberty and property--without due process safeguards 
 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 1045.  
62 Id. at 1050–51. 
63 Elias, supra note 52, at 1124. 
64 Id. at 1131-33. 
65 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044. 
66 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2018 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/D4BT-D4JG]. 
67 See Mulqueen, supra note 50, at 1126–27. 
68 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 66 fig.7.  
69 See Mulqueen, supra note 50, at 1174. 
70 See Elias, supra note 52, at 1142. 
71 Id. at 1143. 
72 Immigration and Nationality Act § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2018), which criminalizes unlawful entry into the United States and 
became a federal crime in 1929. Unlawful entry includes any non-citizen who enters or who attempts to enter the United States. 
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afforded said violent criminals and terrorists. Lopez-Mendoza emphasizes the civil nature of deportation 
hearings, yet undocumented immigrants are increasingly being investigated and tried as criminals. Yet there 
are no safeguards in place to ensure their Fourth Amendment rights are protected.  
DHS and ICE internal standard operating procedures are no longer a safeguard to law enforcement 
misconduct. Regulations prohibit DHS and ICE agents from using unreasonable and disproportionate force 
during the interrogation, arrest, and detention of a suspect.73 Yet a number of complaints have been filed 
alleging ICE agents and law-enforcement officers used unreasonable and disproportionate force during the 
interrogation, arrest, and detention of civil immigration suspects.74 Regulations state that individuals may 
not be detained and subjected to custodial interrogation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that they 
have committed an immigration violation.75 Yet there have been complaints filed that allege they were 
detained by immigration officers who could not have had any reasonable suspicion to believe that they had 
committed immigration infractions.76 Regulations specify that ICE officers may not enter residential 
premises without either a judicially approved search warrant or consent by the occupants of the premises.77 
Yet, in many recent cases, immigration respondents have filed motions to suppress evidence obtained 
during illegal, warrantless, and nonconsensual searches of their homes.78 
Specifically with facial recognition, there is no internal (or external for the matter) procedure to 
govern its use by ICE in DMVs or elsewhere.79 ICE can theoretically expand its facial recognition software 
to other state and federal agency databases such as security camera footage or perhaps they could release 
squadrons of drones into US airspace that are equipped with real-time facial recognition technology or 
could install cameras in hospitals, street corners, and schools. Those are not ridiculous leaps and 
conclusions if law enforcement is already using doorbells to locate undocumented immigrants. Where is 
the line? There are no regulations, no standards of reasonable suspicion, probable causes, or “hunches.” 
Facial recognition is founded on being able to conduct suspicionless searches. There are no detectable 
safeguards in place to ensure that DHS and ICE agents are adhering to the Constitutional standards and 
case law associated with the Fourth Amendment. This is akin to the wild west where anything goes and 
until other safeguards are developed, martial law rules supreme. 
Without the Fourth Amendment protection from government misconduct, there are few forms of 
relief available for undocumented immigrants. O’Connor cited another safeguard in Lopez-Mendoza, 
remedies available to respondents such as declaratory relief.80 However, Justice White wrote in his dissent, 
“[t]he suggestion that alternative remedies, such as civil suits, provide adequate protection is unrealistic.”81 
Few challenge the constitutionality of these searches and due process violations because they are no longer 
in the country and/or are scared and mistrustful of US law enforcement and the justice system. Many times, 
respondents return to situations of extreme poverty and violence and taking the time and effort to pursue 
civil suits are unreasonable. The victims of these violations are powerless. 
Moreover, since 1984, statutory provisions and case law have eroded almost all of the options for 
meaningful judicial review that were once available to immigration respondents whose constitutional rights 
have been violated.82 The 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act limited judicial 
review of removal proceedings, leaving the petition-for-review process as the primary opportunity for 
recourse.83 Another safeguard against law enforcement misconduct is a Bivens Action,84 which allows 
 
73 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(a)(iii) (2020). 
74 See Elias, supra note 52, at 1147. 
75 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1) (2020). 
76 See Elias, supra note 52, at 1147. 
77 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2020). 
78 See Lindsay Kee, “We Don’t Need a Warrant, We’re ICE”, ACLU (Oct. 21, 2011, 5:46 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/we-
dont-need-warrant-were-ice [https://perma.cc/U9RP-V5DN]. 
79 See National Immigration Law Center, supra note 27.  
80 See Elias, supra note 52. 
81 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). 
82 See Elias, supra note 52, at 1153. 
83 Id.  
84 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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victims of Fourth Amendment violations by federal officers acting in the color of federal authority to bring 
a sit for damages. In 2008, the Bush administration decided that I.N.A. § 242 prevents immigration 
respondents from bringing Bivens claims for damages.85 Respondents only had limited opportunities for 
relief in 1984 and those options have since dwindled. 
Most importantly, reliance on remedies is insufficient because both the DHS, who need deterrence, 
and the political forces that dictate policy can prevent the plans from being put into place or can turn 
safeguards into mere paper procedures.86 This concern is particularly apparent in immigration enforcement 
because aliens are disconnected from the political process.87 Those targeted by immigration agents or police 
officers enforcing immigration laws are vulnerable and socially marginalized, and therefore highly unlikely 
to turn to the legal system to seek recompense for any wrongs they have suffered.88 As a result, 
constitutional violations by law-enforcement officers have spread throughout the nation, growing rapidly 
in the last two years and crossing geographical and institutional boundaries with increasing frequency.89  
This really drives the point home that there are not many viable options to fix Fourth Amendment 
violations of unreasonable searches in facial recognition. Since there is no check on the Constitutionality 
of these searches, there is little pressure that they will need to be conducted with warrants with probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion. Also, facial recognition can be easily and quickly run through 
databases, making them an effective “sweep” for evidence of suspected unlawful entry. Chandler v. Miller 
commands that to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.90 Without even an inkling of individualized suspicion the 
employment of facial recognition software becomes nothing more than big brother watching.  
Immigration searches and seizures that are based solely or mostly on racial profiling should 
presumptively constitute “egregious” Fourth Amendment violations because they are unconstitutional 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an immigrant to successfully have 
evidence deemed inadmissible during his removal proceeding, she has to prove that the manner in which 
the evidence was seized was “so egregious” that, not only was there a Fourth Amendment violation, but 
there also was a violation of his right to fundamental fairness and due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment.91 Right now there is not uniformity in how the circuit courts are interpreting “egregious 
violations” but the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit have held that an egregious violation may be found if 
the stop was based on race, nationality, or other grossly improper considerations.92  
When the person in the photo is a white man, the software is right 99 percent of the time.93 
Researchers and numerous studies argue that’s because the software is trained on vast sets of images that 
skew heavily toward white men, leaving women and minorities vulnerable to holes in mammoth 
databases.94 In other words, there are far more white men in databases used to train the A.I. algorithms used 
in facial recognition so the software is inherently “smarter” and better at identifying white men yet struggles 
with women and minorities because it has not had as much “practice.” 
Many believe human error also contributes to facial recognition’s inaccuracies.  Critics worry that 
people are not being trained adequately in how to use the technology and interpret its results.95 Researchers 
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say that law enforcement agencies do not always disclose how its analysts are taught to use the systems, or 
who is conducting the training and they worry that even if a department claims a strong training protocol, 
people will inevitably let biases about gender and race creep into how they assess a match.96 There is not a 
lot of transparency in both the software and how people are using it, which makes it sound like there is 
something to hide.  
How inaccurate is facial recognition?  In 2015, Google had to apologize after its image-recognition 
photo app initially labeled African Americans as “gorillas.”97 The ACLU used Amazon’s Rekognition, the 
software it has been trying to sell to law enforcement and ICE, and incorrectly matched twenty-eight 
members of Congress, and identified them as other people who have been arrested for a crime.98 M.I.T. 
researchers also reported that Rekognition also had trouble correctly identifying a person’s gender.99 The 
Congressional Black Caucus specifically expressed concern to Amazon about the “profound negative 
unintended consequences” face surveillance could have for Black people, undocumented immigrants, and 
protesters.100  
Matching a face template with a face then opens the door to problematic issues.  
 
[O]nce someone has your faceprint, they can get your name, they can find your social 
networking account and they can find and track you in the street, in the stores you visit, the 
Government buildings you enter, and the photos your friends post online. In fact, a series 
of experiments conducted at Carnegie Mellon University objectively concluded that “[i]f 
an individual's face on the street can be identified using a face recognizer and identified 
images from social network sites such as Facebook or LinkedIn, then it becomes possible 
not just to identify that individual, but also to infer additional, and more sensitive, 
information about her.101 
 
Thus, for undocumented immigrants, a search for facial data is not merely a suspicionless search 
like it is for American citizens, but the first step in deportation. Facial data is being used to target and locate 
individuals. 
Instead of pinpointing an individual, facial recognition creates a lineup of people. The technology 
is extremely inaccurate and exponentially more so when the individual is non-white, and non-male. 
Essentially, facial recognition is operating on racial/ethnic bias and is indistinguishable from discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. When applied by the federal government, all race-based 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny,102 and are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to 
further compelling governmental interests. Because the government has not been upfront and transparent 
with its use of facial recognition, it is hard to say whether or not these means really are narrowly tailored. 
Caselaw supports not using the results of racial profiling in deportation hearings. In Gonzalez-
Rivera v. INS, the officer arrested the alien based only on his Hispanic appearance, and the court concluded 
that this constituted egregious behavior that violated the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.103 The 
Ninth Circuit held, “we have long regarded racial oppression as one of the most serious threats to our notion 
of fundamental fairness and consider reliance on the use of race or ethnicity as shorthand for likely illegal 
conduct to be ‘repugnant under any circumstances.”’104 They emphasized: 
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[F]ederal courts cannot encourage impermissible uses of race, reliance on ethnicity as the 
sole factor in the creation of a reasonable suspicion . . . [t]he court compared the 
immigration officers' action to a facial racial classification and concluded that in an equal 
protection context, it was presumptively invalid.105 
 
Racial profiling has not only violated the Fourth Amendment’s unreasonable search clause, but 
also the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause—that requires the government to treat people 
equally.  The history of discriminatory government surveillance makes clear that face surveillance will 
disproportionately harm people already targeted by the government and subjected to racial profiling and 
abuse — immigrants, people of color, and the formerly incarcerated.106 Because facial recognition is less 
accurate for darker skinned faces and women, these systems threaten to further entangle people with law 
enforcement, ripping families apart and increasing the likelihood of racially biased police violence.107 Facial 
recognition is unconstitutional. 
Moreover, facial recognition has also violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause through 
possible Brady violations. Suppression of evidence favorable to a defendant violates due process because 
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.108 Because facial recognition software is inaccurate 
and either misidentifies individuals or picks multiple possible matches, the software creates information 
that could exculpate a defendant. Other matches indicate the possibility of other perpetrators. The fact that 
the analysts of the software are choosing one person from multiple possible people also indicates the 
possibility of other perpetrators and possible improper suggestiveness. Also, the fact that analysts may not 
even be properly trained compounds the possibility of error.  
Thus, when a face template is run through a database looking for person A, it might choose person 
B instead. It chooses person B because B is also a person of color. Person B may also be undocumented. 
There could have been no probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or any suspicion at all. Facial recognition 
has turned into a fishing expedition that casts a wide net and instead of exonerating some defendants it 
implicates others. These are severe Constitutional violations violating serious individual rights.  
Lopez’ reasoning as to why the Fourth Amendment and why undocumented immigrants have no 
expectation of privacy are not applicable in 2019. There is increasing debate on whether or not to relitigate 
Lopez-Mendoza to reconsider applying the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings. Many critics believe 
this is the solution. However, as the above analysis shows, an increase in investigative technology and 
pervasive and diverse constitutional violations have dictated a need for other protections. Also, as 
emphasized by O’Connor, the body or identity of an immigrant is never suppressible in court. Reinstating 
the exclusionary rule is not an option. 
O’Connor’s Lopez-Mendoza reasoning does not hold up in 2019 with evidence obtained from facial 
recognition software because  the increasingly criminal nature of immigration and its enforcement, the lack 
of relief available when constitutional violations occur, and the severe racism and disregard for exculpatory 
procedures. Much has changed since 1984, but Lopez-Mendoza is still the principal case controlling the 
inclusion or exclusion of evidence in immigration proceedings.109 It effectively disqualified undocumented 
immigrants from having the same level of privacy as American citizens.110 With privacy chipped away and 
a serious need to fix the civil liberties violations of undocumented immigrants, there is a serious hole needed 
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IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
In 2008, Illinois passed the Biometric Information Privacy Act, (“BIPA”), a law protecting the 
“biometric identifiers and biometric information” of its residents.111 Two other states, Texas and 
Washington, also followed and passed their own biometric privacy laws, although not as robust as the one 
in Illinois, which strictly forbids private entities to collect, capture, purchase or otherwise obtain a person’s 
biometrics — including a scan of their “face geometry” — without that person’s consent.112 Face templates 
are biometric data, data used to identify specific individuals, and thus using an individual’s face and face 
templates in algorithms is a violation of Illinois law. Violations of BIPA are essentially tort causes of action 
and individuals can then sue for damages when violations occur. 
Of course, legislation like BIPA would need to be strengthened to protect undocumented 
immigrants. As demonstrated in Parts II and III, they are more vulnerable in regard to their privacy than 
American citizens and there is more risk for unconstitutional abuses. Furthermore, just like declaratory 
relief, most undocumented immigrants would not seek damages through civil suits for privacy violations 
like Illinois citizens can. However, BIPA demonstrates that American is prepared to recognize the rights of 
self like in face templates and restrictions in using them in identifying algorithms. The principles behind 
BIPA lay a solid foundation for additional, more robust rights to be created for undocumented immigrants. 
Interestingly enough, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, was passed under the commerce clause—Congress’ power to pass 
legislation over commercial activity. Among the other plenary powers of Congress is the right to enact 
legislation concerning intellectual property. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 grants Congress the enumerated power “[t]o 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” A possible solution to protect undocumented 
immigrants from facial recognition searches is to protect their face templates under the IP power of 
Congress. 
The problem with creating property-like rights for face templates is American law does not 
recognize these “rights of self.” Americans do not actually own their names, social security numbers, or 
identities and courts have struggled giving property rights to body parts like sperm cells, spleen cells, 
corneas, etc.113 Similarly, no one actually owns their fingerprints. However, a face template is not as 
tangible as body parts and can exist entirely within the digital realm. And unlike fingerprints or body parts, 
there is a higher probability of abuse of face templates—as evidenced above, racial discrimination in 
investigations can occur from face template evidence alone. When an investigation yields fingerprints or 
even DNA, it is not proceeding through discriminatory avenues but rather reliable scientific paths. Facial 
recognition is too inaccurate to be relied upon and the threat of discrimination is too high. Add in the 
constitutional concerns of undocumented immigrants, and the necessity to create present possessory 
interests in face templates becomes of great importance. 
Applying a framework of protection under current intellectual property law is also problematic. 
Companies who create facial recognition software may have it protected under patents or trade secrets, but 
this protection does not extend to the face templates themselves. Data is not patentable subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. § 101,114 and trade secrecy is not applicable because data should not be surrounded by a cloak of 
secrecy but rather should be more transparent. A big issue behind ICE using data to target and find 
undocumented immigrants is the mystery behind their methods and sources and to give individuals more 
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rights in their data, we need to seek out ways to make their means more out in the open. Also, granting 
companies who cooperate with law enforcement property rights in the face template data further makes 
undocumented immigrants more vulnerable and helpless. 
Copyright protection is another possibility but not without its issues. In order to be eligible for US 
copyright, data needs to be original and have an element of creativity added.115 Programs, like facial 
recognition, are generally copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (because the codes creating the programs 
are “written”). But US copyright only protects against copying and distributing of any eligible compilation 
of data. The exclusive reproduction and derivative work rights, as construed by the Supreme Court, will not 
normally prevent unauthorized extractions of disparate data.116 Thus, this protection is more for the 
databases and not the data contained within the databases. Again, copyright protection is not adequate for 
protection of face template data within these third-party databases. 
One of the largest problems with creating IP protections in face templates is the ease at which 
digital data is alienable. DMV photos, stock photos, or video stills from Ring or other available sources can 
easily be exchanged between parties. Likewise, so can face templates. This argument is also at the heart of 
privacy arguments against property rights in personal information.117 Alienability is among the “bundle of 
sticks” in property rights and it would seem that creating intellectual property rights would create more 
problems than solutions. 
However, it could be useful to look outside of the United States for a better solution for rights in 
face templates. The UK specifically has been more favorable to protecting compilations of factual 
information than many other countries in Europe and also the USA.118 But more importantly, the European 
continental copyright principle of moral rights provides a more workable framework. Morals rights are 
among the bundle of rights given by European copyright,119 and emphasize the strong link between the 
work and its author.120 Among the commonly recognized moral rights are the paternity right (i.e., the right 
to be identified as the author of the work) and of integrity (i.e., the right to protect the work from alterations 
that would be harmful to the author's reputation).121 Also in France, authors also have moral rights of 
“divulgation” (i.e., the right to decide when and under what circumstances to divulge the work) and 
sometimes even of withdrawal (i.e., the right to withdraw all published copies of the work if the work no 
longer represents the author's views or otherwise would be detrimental to the author's reputation).122 The 
integrity and divulgation interests may be the closest analogous moral rights that might be adaptable to 
protect personal data.123 
These concepts are codified in the 1996 Database Directive, which harmonized database law in 
Europe. It created a sui generis intellectual property right to protect against the extraction or re-utilization 
of all or the substantial part of the contents of a database.124 The database contents do not even have to 
necessarily be protected by copyright in the first place. Even though it protects database owners/creators, it 
still uses the right to exclude others and places limits on how the data can be used. 
Moral rights could be granted to face templates to protect them from unauthorized use from the 
government.  Paternity rights can be given to give individuals some claim to their faces. An integrity right 
can also be given to place limits on what their faces and face templates may not be used for and the right 
of divulgation limits what they may be used for. Thus, facial recognition software would not be able to be 
run on databases containing a person’s face or face template because they have an intellectual property right 
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in this data, the paternity right. And by a statuary limitation, the integrity and divulgation rights would 
prohibit the searches from taking place.  Another possible solution is granting contracts akin to licenses for 
a face or face template. However, this would create a myriad of contracts to be decided upon and considered 
and is not as workable as moral rights.  
Of course, the United States has yet to adopt anything similar to moral rights in the realm of 
copyright and creating a new body of law to protect biometric data is perhaps too large a step. Conceptually, 




Despite the drastic changes to the world of immigration since 1984, American courts have failed 
to increase the privacy rights of undocumented immigrants. Constitutional violations are continually being 
repeated in deprivations of liberty and property resulting in family separations, children without parents, 
and children in border prisons.  
Ultimately, Congress has the Constitutional power to regulate Immigration, but how can they 
protect the substantive rights of individuals undergoing the process of immigration/deportation? 
This was an academic legal exploration in how to give undocumented immigrants more rights in 
their facial data because of the injustices of facial recognition technology in both the immigration 
enforcement and justice systems. The privacy rights of undocumented immigrants have been eroded and 
are virtually (and digitally) non-existent. Realistically, the civil rights of undocumented immigrants cannot 
be entirely protected by European copyright law, adapted to these means, but Congress can possibly use IP 
to enable power to create these protections.  
The dangers of facial recognition are currently being debated in legislatures and courts all over the 
country. The California legislature has already banned facial recognition software on police body cams.125 
The ACLU is suing the Department of Justice, FBI, and DEA over the use of facial recognition software, 
saying the “government's use of biometric identification and tracking technologies—tools that enable 
"undetectable, persistent and suspicionless surveillance on an unprecedented level."126 The federal 
government continues to push the envelope with surveillance and facial recognition and drones at the 
Mexican border.127 It appears as though the use of facial recognition is the biggest loop-hole in the Bill of 
Rights. James Madison did not even see it coming. 
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